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Abstract. Comparative education has traditionally meant the study of national education  
systems. But how far is this approach valid today?  Doesn’t the ‘decline’ of the nation state  
make national systems obsolete? Isn’t the very idea of a ‘system’ anachronistic in a world of  
market triumphalism and global disorganization? The purpose of this article is to explore  
how globalisation is changing education and the implication of this for comparative study.  
Why study education systems and why study national education systems in particular? What  
else should comparativists study, and how? What defines the field of comparative education?  
These questions are approached first historically and secondly methodologically. 
Introduction
Comparative education has traditionally meant the study of national education systems. The 
field  first  developed  in  the  early nineteenth  century in  parallel  with  the  rise  of  national 
education, and it took the national system as its main object of enquiry (Noah and Epstein, 
1969).  The twentieth  century comparativists  who consolidated  it  as  an academic  subject, 
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including  Michael  Sadler,  Isaac  Kandel  and  Nicholas  Hans,  continued  to  focus  on  the 
classification and explanation of characteristics of different national systems. But how far is 
this approach valid today?  Doesn’t the ‘decline’ of the nation state make national systems 
obsolete?  And  isn’t  the  very  idea  of  a  ‘system’  anachronistic  in  a  world  of  market 
triumphalism  and  global  disorganization?  As  Peter  Jarvis  asks  in  a  recent  edition  of 
Comparative  Education:  ‘Why should  we  undertake  comparative  analysis  at  all  in  this 
Global Village?’(Jarvis, 2000). 
These are tough questions for comparative educationalists because the concept of the national 
education  system  forms  the  keystone  of  the  whole  mental  architecture  of  comparative 
education. It may be hard to think comparative without it. Nevertheless, the question has been 
rightly posed and needs answering. The purpose of my lecture is to explore how globalisation 
is changing education and the implication of this for comparative study. Why study education 
systems and  why  study  national education  systems  in  particular?  What  else  should 
comparativists study, and how? What defines the field of comparative education? I approach 
these questions first historically and secondly methodologically. 
The Parallel Rise of Comparative Education and National Education Systems. 
Writing  about  education  in  foreign  countries  has  a  long  history,  going  back  in  fact  to 
Antiquity. Xenephon described the training of Persian youth for Citizenship, comparing the 
aims and structures of Persian and Greek education; Julius Caesar, in his De Bello Gallico 
(book vi), commented on the educational aims and procedures of the Druids and attempted 
some general explanations; and Marco Polo wrote about education in China.  In the early 
modern era, well-travelled literati from Europe frequently wrote about their observations of 
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education in other European countries and even in Asia, just as Asian writers commented on 
their experiences in Europe For the most part these were unsystematic travellers’ tales, what 
Noah and Eckstein refer to as a superior kind of journalism (Noah and Eckstein, 1969).   
This tradition continued in the nineteenth century with the reports on foreign education by 
Europeans  such as  Victor  Cousin,  James  Kay-Shuttleworth  and Matthew Arnold,  and by 
American educationalists such as Horace Mann, Orville Taylor and John Griscom. In a sense 
these were still traveller’s tales but they had taken on a new form. They were somewhat more 
systematic at description and classification, although often still highly subjective; they also 
now played a significant political role, in the sense of being used for policy purposes. Reports 
on foreign education systems were used as an early and weak form of ‘evidence-based policy 
making’: they sought foreign examples of policies and practises to borrow, and empirical data 
on the effects of foreign policies and practises as evidential support for policies advocated at 
home.   They were also conscious  of  the fact  that  they were studying a new educational  
phenomenon – the  national  education system.  Marc-Antoine Jullien,  often considered the 
founder of comparative education, set out in his 1817 text, ‘Esquisse et Vues Préliminaries  
d’un  Ouvrage  sur  L’Education  Comparé,  to  provide  some  systematic  comparative 
classification of education systems, based on rudimentary questionnaire surveys. 
Comparative  education,  in  its  nascent  form as  a  ‘discipline’  or,  as  some  prefer,  a  ‘sub-
disciplinary field  of  application’  (usually of  comparative  social  science),  began  with  the 
notions  of  national  systems  because  they were  the  emergent  contemporary reality  –  the 
important  things  to  understand.  The  national  education  systems  which  arose  in  northern 
Europe and the northern USA from the late eighteenth century were  sui generis;  radically 
different from the preceding artisanal  and clerical forms of learning. As Margaret Archer 
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described them in her classic  book,  The Origins of  Education Systems (1979),  they were 
systems of formal schooling at least partly funded and supervised by the state, providing a 
putative  monopoly of  education  to  all  school  age children  in  a  given nation;  and whose 
different levels became increasingly systemically coordinated and integrated over time. 
These systems began with the national networks of elementary schools that were developed 
with  state  financial  and  legal  assistance  into  a  universal  phenomenon.  Post-elementary 
secondary and technical schooling subsequently expanded from its tiny elite base, to allow a 
small trickle of upward mobility and give credibility to the Napoleonic maxim of the career 
open to talents. Except in the American North and West, the secondary schools represented a 
parallel system separate from the mass elementary school system until considerably later, but 
gradually institutions did became more articulated with one another, and systems emerged 
which were increasingly regulated by the state. As public schools came to predominate over 
private  and  voluntary  institutions,  governments  increased  their  control  over  systems, 
providing the majority of funds, licensing and inspecting schools and teachers, organizing 
teacher training through growing networks of dedicated Normal schools and, in most cases, 
overseeing national certification and standard school curricula. These were definitely systems 
in formation, and they had increasingly central functions within society.
They were also distinctly national, both in the sense of being state-driven and in the sense of 
meeting needs defined in national terms. National education systems developed, as I argued 
in  Education  and  State  Formation  (Green,  1990),  as  part  of  the  long  process  of  state 
formation that stretched in a great arch from the late absolutist states, through the French 
Revolution  and  beyond  to  the  gradual  construction  of  democratic  nation  states  in  the 
nineteenth  century.  Through these national  education systems states fashioned disciplined 
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workers and loyal military recruits; created and celebrated national languages and literatures; 
popularized national histories and myths of origin, disseminated national laws, customs and 
social mores, and generally explained the ways of the state to the people and the duties of the 
people to the state. National education was a massive engine of integration, assimilating the 
local to the national and the particular to the general.  In short, it created, or tried to create, the 
civic identity and national consciousness which would bind each to the state and reconcile 
each to the other, making actual citizens out of those who were deemed such in law by virtue 
of their birth or voluntary adoption.
It is no surprise then that the first comparative educationalists were preoccupied with systems 
and  with  nationhood.  They  organized  their  classifications  of  education  around  national 
systems; they collected data at the national level where they could; and they sought national 
characteristics to explain variations between systems. They reckoned, rightly, that the state 
was a major force in fashioning education systems, and therefore analysed national political 
forms, as well as other national factors such as language, climate and religion, to understand 
differences between systems. 
Jullien  was  the  first  to  try  to  classify  the  characteristics  of  different  national  systems, 
focussing on institutional  forms and processes (Jullien,  1817).  Emile  Levasseur,  a French 
statistician later in the century, made more systematic quantitative comparative comparisons 
using data on enrolments (Levasseur, 1897). He also sought to explain variations in country 
systems with reference to  religion,  race,  climate,  and levels of democracy. He found, for 
instance,  as  the  historian  Carlo  Cipolla  was  later  to  confirm,  that  protestant  northern 
European states typically had higher enrolments than southern Catholic states (Cipolla, 1969). 
There  was  some  occasional  interest  in  within-system  differences.  Joseph  Kay,  another 
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educational traveller, noted, like Jullien before him, that comparison across regions within 
states might be fruitful, particularly where there were interesting sets of variations as between 
cantons in Switzerland (Noah and Eckstein, 1969). However, it  was mainly cross-national 
study of systems that preoccupied these early comparativists.
The major comparative scholars of the first half of the twentieth century, from Sadler, down 
to  Kandel  and Hans,  were equally concerned with characterizing and explaining national 
systems, although they did this more rigorously and with more concern for the complexities 
of causation than their forbears.  Sadler was famously concerned with the social contexts 
external to institutions. He believed, contrary to modern orthodoxies about ‘school effects’, 
that these were more important than internal institutional dynamics to the understanding of 
how the education process worked in each country. Kandel also explored the cultural and 
historical  ‘forces  and  factors’  behind  system  variation,  including  the  roles  of  State  and 
Church, and the effects of class, race, and social and economic organization. 
Both viewed education through the lens of the nation state. According to Sadler: ‘All good 
and live education is an expression of national life and character. It is rooted in the history of 
the nation and fitted to its needs.’ (quoted in Noah and Eckstein, p. 41). Kandel, likewise, 
argued in the preface to his major work, Comparative Education, that his work was ‘based on 
the point of view that education systems are dominated by national ends, and that it is the 
duty of educators and teachers to understand the meaning of nationalism and all the forces 
that contribute to it’ (Kandel, 1933, p.xxiv). Kandel was a liberal internationalist and aware 
that nationalism could take what he called a ‘sinister’ direction, although given that he wrote 
in the 1930s he was perhaps less alert to the imminent dangers than he might have been. 
However his approach was imbued with a nation state perspective. There is little discussion 
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in his works of national minorities or intra-state cultural differences. Although he notes ‘that 
there is considerable danger in employing such a generalization as national character’ (1933, 
p.23), he didn’t, for all his scholarship, entirely escape the trap. 
These  early pioneers  treated  national  cultures  and institutions  from an historical  vantage 
point, stressing long-range patterns and continuities and what institutional economists now 
call ‘path dependency’. Arguably they veered towards a kind of national cultural determinism 
and they were perhaps rather less attuned to historical discontinuities and structural divisions 
of class and ethnicity than they might have been had their scholarship extended more to the 
works of the founding fathers of sociology. However, when their historical humanist legacy 
was superseded in the 1960s with a more social scientific approach this was, on the one hand, 
through  the  new scientism of  Noah  and  Eckstein  (1969)  and,  on  the  other,  through  the 
pragmatic  problem  solving-approach  of  Brian  Holmes  (1965).  These  indeed  pulled 
comparative  education  closer  to  social  science,  although  somewhat  at  the  expense  of 
historical  depth,  as  Andreas  Kazemias  has  noted  (2001).  However,  much  of  the  new 
comparative  education  remained  narrowly  empirical  -  either  positivist  or  policy-reform 
oriented  -  and  still  adrift  from  much  of  the  more  theoretically  nuanced  work  in  other 
comparative social science disciplines. 
Perspectives also remained largely national. The national system remained the main unit of 
comparison, although the focus now was as much on outcomes as causes. Increasingly, as 
governments became more obsessed with measuring national performance, and as the IEA 
and  other  bodies  obliged  with  major  international  surveys  of  achievement,  comparative 
education was drawn into a kind of cross-national Olympics  - ranking education systems in 
terms of their effectiveness. Countless monographs from the OECD, CEDEFOP and other 
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bodies also focused on the description and classification of national systems. Apparently, the 
more internationalised education research became, the more it focused on comparing national 
systems. 
So what happened in the remaining decades of the last century to cause us to ask whether 
education systems may now be in decline and cross-national  analysis  obsolete?  The brief 
answer is globalisation.
Globalisation and Education
So how has globalisation impacted on education? The answer must be fundamentally, but not 
in the ways that are often argued. 
Globalisation itself has not yet substantially eroded national control over education. It is true 
that supra-national bodies have increasing influence in some areas. The OECD and World 
Bank have some impact,  particularly on weaker  countries,  through their  relentless  global 
marketing  of  favoured  educational  policies,  often  backed  by  substantial  financial  clout. 
Within Europe, the Commission is undoubtedly keen to extend its sphere of influence, not 
least  in  its  attempt  to  support  the  creation  of  a  European  Knowledge Economy through 
Lifelong  Learning.  However,  education  still  remains  officially  a  matter  of  national 
competence, which few Member States are willing to cede. The fact that the Commission is 
obliged to advance its agenda through voluntary rather than regulatory means, through the so-
called ‘Open Method of Coordination’, only underlines the point.
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Governments  still  seek  to  manage  their  national  systems  -  indeed,  in  some  ways,  more 
actively than before with  ever  proliferating targets  and audits.  They know that  education 
remains one area where they still have some control. As Robert Reich (1991) has pointed out, 
despite the waning of the ‘national economy’ and despite the internationalization of most of 
the factors of production, human skills remain relatively immobile and national. Governments 
increasingly see them as state resources to be deployed in the battle for competitive advantage 
in the global market. They are not about to give up this prerogative. Nor can they entirely 
ignore the need for the original Durkheimian function of education in transmitting national 
cultures and promoting social  cohesion.  This  may be more difficult  in modern pluralistic 
societies, where national and group identities increasingly part company from what is left of 
the saliency of statehood and citizenship (Delanty, 2000).  However, as the centrifugal forces 
of globalisation relentlessly disrupt and fragment societies, governments simply cannot afford 
to exempt education systems from their responsibilities for promoting social cohesion. There 
are no other public agencies left which can do it (Green, 1997).
Nor  are  education  systems  all  converging  on  a  single  model  -  despite  the  influence  of 
transnational agencies and the proliferation of policy borrowing. New global policy rhetorics - 
like lifelong learning - are certainly emerging, but in practise they are interpreted and applied 
in quite different ways in different places, as my earlier research with Alison Wolf and Tom 
Leney sought to show (Green, Wolf and Leney, 1999). Education systems in Europe, for 
instance, vary considerably in their  degrees of centralization and market penetration; their 
approaches to selection and early specialization in secondary schooling, and their dominant 
forms of upper secondary provision. 
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However, in certain key respects, globalisation does alter the prospects for traditional national 
education systems. 
Most important, is the impact of globalisation on the demand for skills and qualifications. 
With increased global economic competition,  advanced economies can no longer compete 
with low wage economies in cost-competitive manufacturing and retain their living standards 
-  hence  the  rush  towards  the  high  value-added  sectors  which  constitute  the  so-called 
knowledge economy (Brown, Green and Lauder, 2001). There has been much hype about the 
miraculous new virtual or ‘weightless’ economy.  The new economy sectors never provided 
that many jobs - the software industry in the US, for instance, still employs less than a quarter 
of the number employed by General Motors - and there was never a prospect of it shifting 
everyone into highly skilled,  highly paid work.  Now, with the bursting of the IT bubble, 
Charles  Leadbeater’s  prescription  (1999) for  ‘Living on Thin Air’ seems  rather  foolish. 
However, it  is still  the case that, on balance, work is becoming more skills intensive, and 
there is increasing pressure on individuals to gain higher qualifications or risk marginalization 
in the job market (Ashton et al, 1999). Hence the demand on governments to provide more 
learning opportunities intensifies.
However, governments are caught in a double bind here. As global economic competition 
escalates demand for learning, so it diminishes government capacity to meet that demand. 
Global  market  pressures  force  governments  to  keep  control  of  public  spending to  avoid 
uncompetitive tax levels which will deter foreign investors and drive domestic firms and jobs 
abroad. The European Union, following the same global market logic, reinforces the point 
through its notorious ‘Growth and Stability Pact’ which obliges Member States to keep their 
budgets deficits  below 3% of GDP. These dual effects  – of rising demand for skills  and 
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qualifications and diminished national state capacity to deliver them – create an international 
market for education increasingly attractive to private sector investors. 
Higher education is to date the most internationalised and commercialised of the educational 
sectors. As international demand for them rises, so university research and teaching become 
internationally traded commodities offering potentially rich returns to those institutions which 
compete  best  in  the  global  market.   Facilitated  by  new  educational  technologies,  and 
supported by supra-national bodies such as the European Commission, international higher 
education teaching and research have grown exponentially and look set to continue to do so. 
In most countries, up until now, this has involved mainly welcome additional revenues for 
public sector institutions, but the potential for private sector involvement is clear: even in 
1999 the OECD estimated the value of trade in higher education services at $30 bn. 
The US private sector has already cashed in on this in a big way. Not only are many of the 
leading  universities  private  businesses,  but  there  has  been  a  huge  growth  in  the 
commercialisation and corporate branding of university life, so that most American campuses 
are festooned with advertizing logos and their faculties stuffed with corporate chairs. Nike 
alone have sponsorship deals with more than 200 campus athletics departments. The threat to 
academic independence from the ‘gagging’ deals that often go with corporate sponsorship of 
research and entire campuses hardly needs emphasising.  The iniquitous ‘non-disparagement 
clause’ which went with Reebok’s sponsorship of the University of Wisconsin is well known 
because students and faculty campaigned against it, but there must be many less blatant cases 
which never come to public attention (Klein, 2001).  
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School education is neither so internationalised nor so open to global commercial exploitation 
as higher education for obvious reasons. The majority of children will not cross borders to go 
to school and internationalised virtual schooling is not an option where child minding and 
socialization remain primary purposes of schooling for both parents and states. Nor have the 
profit opportunities seemed good enough to date to attract major corporate investment into 
the delivery of home student learning, although this is now growing. Edubusinesses such as 
Edison and Tessaract in the US have not been notably successful in running public schools 
and  school  districts  because  they  have  found  it  difficult,  not  surprisingly,  to  maintain 
standards and turn a profit  at  the standard levels  of per student  funding (Fitz  and Beers, 
2002).  In  Britain,  Education  Action  Zones  have  received  relatively  little  private  sector 
investment and only handful of failing education authorities and schools have been taken over 
by for-profit businesses. However, the number is growing. Tower Hamlets LEA has recently 
been handed over to the trading wing of SERCO (Regan, 2002). 
Creeping  forms  of  privatisation  are  increasingly  evident,  particularly  in  the  English  – 
speaking countries. Charter schools, less tied by regulations and standards than the public 
schools, offer better opportunities in the US for profitable edubusiness, along with textbook 
and teaching aid production, most notably with Channel One’s TV broadcasts reaching over 8 
million school students which smuggle in advertising with current affairs programming. In 
the UK the major form of privatisation to date has come with the commercial contracting out 
of services such as school meals and cleaning, and with the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
which involves private sector financing and operating of public service facilitates which are 
rented back by the state. By November 2000, there were 71 such education projects planned 
worth some £680 m and involving 673 schools (Fitz  and Beers, 2002). But there is  also 
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increasing  involvement  of  private  companies  like  Nord  Anglia  in  mainstream  delivery 
activities such as curriculum development, school inspection and school improvement. 
Britain  has  been  more  active  in  the  privatisation  of  services  than  most  countries. 
Nevertheless, as Fitz and Beers conclude in their recent study, ‘the privatisation of public 
education …has so far moved at glacial speed’ (Fitz and Beers, 2002).  However, one should 
underestimate  the  commercial  potential  and  political  temptation  that  may  push  in  this 
direction. While the European Union maintains the Stability Pact’s punitive stance towards 
public  spending,  European governments  will  be  tempted  to  find  ingenious  ways  to  plug 
public service gaps with private investment, as the UK government does with the PFI which 
conveniently takes  public  investment  off  balance  sheet.  Equally,  at  a  time  of  dwindling 
capital  investment  opportunities,  potentially lucrative  markets  in  services  are  increasingly 
attractive to investors and corporate pressure for the opening up of these markets persists. 
International  agencies are  responding. While  the terms of WTO’s General  Agreement  on 
Trade in Services (GATS) still  remain somewhat ambiguous in relation publicly provided 
services,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  major  interests  lie  behind  the  move  to  extend  the 
international market in education provision.
Increasing privatisation  of education is  likely,  as Geoff Whitty and others (Whitty,  2002; 
Whitty,  Halpin  and  Power,  1998)  have  argued,  to  increase  inequalities  in  educational 
outcomes.  Markets, and even quasi-markets, tend to work like that. This is not the place to 
debate the evidential basis for this argument, but at least one point needs to be stressed here in 
relation  to  UK  educational  politics.  Britain  has  a  widely acknowledged  history of  class 
division and inequality in education. The results of the recent OECD PISA study, confirm 
those of previous IEA and IALS studies, that relative to a range of comparator countries, we 
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have exceptionally wide distributions of educational outcomes. Indeed the international test 
evidence from PISA for 15 year olds shows us amongst the most unequal countries in the 
sample of OECD countries, where typically countries with narrower distribution have higher 
average scores (OECD, 2001; Green, 2003 forthcoming). 
This level of inequality may be detrimental to the economy, producing a highly polarised 
labour  market,  which  arguably  in  turn  encourages  a  high  skills/low  skills  dualism  in 
competition  strategies,  and lower  overall  productivity  than  in  many competitor  countries 
(Brown, Green and Lauder, 2001; Crouch, Finegold and Sako, 1999). There is also growing 
evidence that it is detrimental to social cohesion. 
Recent work conducted by John Preston, Ricardo Sabato and myself for the Wider Benefits of 
Learning Centre certainly points in this direction. Using IALS data on adult literacy scores 
across countries to  estimate skills  distributions,  and standard Gini  coefficients  on income 
inequality,  we have confirmed the findings of Nickell  and Layard (1998),  using different 
methods, that there is a strong correlation between skills distributions and income inequality 
across countries. Taking this a step further, we have developed a combined factor for national 
level social cohesion (using WVS data on aggregate levels of trust and other measures of 
civic  cooperation),  and  find,  again,  a  strong  correlation  cross-nationally  between  skills 
distribution  and social  cohesion.  As Figure One shows,  excluding Norway and Germany, 
there is a strong and significant correlation of -0.765 between social cohesion and education 
inequality variables (see Green, Preston and Sabates (2003). 
More educationally equal countries tend also to be more cohesive on these measures.  Clearly 
these correlations say nothing about the direction of causality, and we would judge that this 
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runs both ways and involves a range of different factors. Nevertheless the results are highly 
suggestive – sufficiently so in fact to prompt OECD and World Bank researchers to undertake 
similar analyses. By applying our methods to PISA data they achieve similar  results  and, 
perhaps surprisingly, draw similar conclusions: in terms of national policy: improving skills 
distribution matters as much as raising average levels (Duthilleul and Ritzen, 2002).  
.   
Globalisation,  then,  does  not  reduce  national  interests  in  education,  nor  the  desire  of 
governments  to serve them. However, what it  does do is  raise the demand for skills  and 
qualifications  whilst  reducing state  capacity to  meet  them.  The most  ubiquitous  national 
response to all this is,  in fact, Lifelong Learning - that most globalised and chamelion of 
educational discourses, which both masks and legitimates multiple policy changes, including 

























privatisation.  As competition and technological change drive up the employer demand for 
skills,  and  as  individuals  increasingly  compete  for  career-enhancing  certificates,  so 
governments have to find new ways to meet the demand. Lifelong learning is an ingenious 
solution,  made possible in part by the new learning technologies. By declaring learning a 
lifelong and  ‘life wide’ process - occurring everywhere from the school to the home, the 
workplace and the community- governments are able both to respond to individual demands 
for more diverse learning opportunities which mesh with their modern lifestyles, and to shift 
the costs, which they can no longer bear, onto employers, individuals and their families and 
communities (Green, 2000).
This, more than any other development,  challenges the notion of the  ‘education system’. 
We have been used to thinking about education in terms of schools and colleges and other 
institutions.  In years to come these may well cease to be the main locus of learning activity. 
To this extent the idea of the educational system does become marginalized. We will have to 
start  to  think  more  about  informal  learning,  workplace  learning,  and  learning  in  the 
community and home (Broadfoot, 2000). 
Implications for Comparative Education
So what are the implications of globalisation for Comparative Education? One conclusion we 
could draw is that cross-national comparison is now redundant. Ulrich Beck has taken this 
view (Beck, 2000). Social science, he says, has for too long been the creature of the nation 
state; since the founding fathers’ first treated society and state as co-extensive, the state has 
operated as a kind ‘container’ of all concepts and data. Now in an age of globalisation, says 
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Beck, a  ‘nationally based sociology is  becoming obsolete’.  The message is  clear:  social 
science should abandon the  ‘methodological nationalism’ of its intellectual past rather as 
Marx claimed to caste off his  ‘erstwhile philosophical conscience’ in abandoning Hegel. 
The new mission should be to analyse world society and transnational space. 
This is  a tall  order for comparative education.  Like social  science in  general,  and indeed 
probably more so, comparative education as a field has its origins in national thinking. From 
Jullien,  Levasseur and Sadler, through to Kandel, Hans, Mallinson and King, comparative 
education  has  taken  the  national  system  as  its  main  object  of  enquiry  and  ‘national 
character’ as its main explanandum. This exclusively national way of thinking is now surely 
outdated.  Explaining educational structures and outcomes in terms of national character and 
culture was always a somewhat essentialist exercise, in danger of reifying national culture as 
some  irreducible  and  homogenous  property.  Now,  with  growing  social  diversity,  the 
glocalisation of culture and the creation of transnational cultural spaces, this approach will 
surely not do. Comparativists should cease taking national states as the only - or even main - 
units for comparison. 
There  is  certainly a  case  for  more  studies  of  education  and  learning  across  sub-national 
regions  and  communities  -  like  the  so-called  ‘home  international’  studies  in  the  UK 
conducted  by  David  Raffe  and  colleagues  (Raffe,  1999)  or  Karen  Evans’  multi-layered 
comparisons  of youth learning and transitions  in  matched cities  in  Germany and the UK 
(Evans  and  Heinz,  1994).  Much  more  comparative  work  could  be  done  in  this  area.  In 
Belgium for instance, the language group forms the main basis for educational administration, 
and so a natural unit for comparing the combined effects of different structures and cultures 
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on outcomes. Likewise Switzerland, with its French-speaking and German-speaking regions 
with  different  educational  structures and  cultures,  provides  an  ideal  laboratory  for 
comparative work. 
There is also room for more studies across supra-national regions.  The work of David Ashton 
and colleagues on European and East Asian skills  formation systems (Ashton and Green, 
1996; Ashton et  al  1999) opens up the possibility of explicitly cross-regional analyses of 
skills formation, drawing on the now burgeoning regional studies of political economy (eg 
Albert, 1993; Berger and Dore, 1996; Dore, 2000; Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993; 
Hutton, 1995; Streeck, 1997; Thurow, 1993). The High Skills  Project (Brown, Green and 
Lauder, 2001) set out to analyse  ‘national routes to the high skills economy,’ but like the 
earlier studies by Ashton et al (op cit) and Crouch et al (1999) found as much potential for 
comparison of regional and sectoral differences.  One can now imagine many more ambitious 
studies that would take the supra-national region as the predominant unit. There is substantial 
evidence,  after  all,  that  education  and  skills  formation  systems  do  tend  to  cluster  along 
regional lines (Green, Wolf and Leney, 1999). If this is the case, comparativists could learn a 
great deal about how contexts shape educational change by studying how far pan-regional 
characteristics, net of the policy diffusion effects between the countries within them, do in 
fact explain cross-regional variations in systems characteristics.  
Lastly, the salience of international cross-sectoral comparison also suggests another important 
point regarding units  of comparison. So long as the units  being compared have‘societal’ 
characteristics - (ie in terms of characteristic institutional structures and rules) - there is no 
reason  for  limiting  comparison  to  territorially  defined  units.  Diasporic  language  groups, 
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distributed communities and ‘virtual communities’, are all - in theory at least - amenable to 
comparative educational research. 
This  evident  potential  for  comparison  at  different  non-national  levels  does  not  mean, 
however, that Beck is correct to argue that cross-national study is obsolete. School systems, 
unlike some higher education systems, are still very national institutions. Their structures and 
processes  are  shaped  primarily  by national  legislation  and  the  national  institutional  and 
cultural  contexts  in  which they operate.  To understand the structural  (ie  institutional  and 
cultural) factors that determine their forms and outcomes may often require that we compare 
across countries -  especially where there is  too little  system variation within countries  to 
allow within-country comparison (Noah and Eckstein, 1969).
Nations are still the preferred units for comparative social science for good reasons. Many of 
the  data  are  still  collected  at  national  level.  Many of  the  operative  societal  variables  are 
measured as national level aggregates because they proxy for structures and institutions  - 
labour  markets,  industry  structures,  political  systems,  cultural  traits  -  which  are  still 
essentially national. Countries do still vary regularly and substantially on a whole range of 
demographic, economic and cultural indicators. As Ronald Inglehart tersely concludes from 
his  exhaustive  study of  data  for  25  countries  in  the  World  Values  Survey (1990)  ‘The 
peoples  of  different  societies  are  characterized  by enduring differences  in  basic  attitudes, 
values and skills: In other words they have different cultures.’ (1990, p.3)  These cultures are 
not monolithic and nor are they immutable. However, in given times and places they act as 
important determinants of social and political behaviour which cannot be left out of account. 
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The country level, therefore, remains important for comparative analysis - but it is only one of 
a number of levels at which comparison can be effectively used. The question of units of 
comparison should not  in  any case be decided  a priori,  but  rather  according to  research 
criteria. As Neil Smelser has argued, the main criteria for choosing the unit of comparison 
should be that  it  is:   1) appropriate  to  the theoretical  problem;  2) causally related to the 
phenomenon being studied; 3) that there are data available at this level (Smelser, 1976). This 
allows for comparison at various different levels, including multiple levels. The difficulty is 
to make sure that where the level of observation differs from the level of explanation that 
false extrapolations are not made from the evidence at one level to justify explanations at a 
different  level  –  thus  falling  into  the  trap  which  economists  call  the  ‘ecological  fallacy’ 
(Smelser, 1976). 
The main methodological challenge for comparative educationalists is not, in any case, about 
levels of analysis; it is about the nature of comparative analysis per se and whether to do it at 
all.  Peter Jarvis’ question :  ‘Why should we undertake comparative analysis at all in this 
Global Village?’(Jarvis, 2000) may be not so hard to answer, however.1 Globablization, as 
argued above, is not so far removing difference from the world as to make comparison and 
contrast  impossible.  So  long  as  there  are  still  contrasting  societal  units  to  compare, 
comparison is still possible. Globalisation may alter the spacial dimensions of what we take 
1 See  also:  R.  Dale,  (200)  ‘Globalisation  and  Education:  Demonstrating  a  ‘Common  World 
Educational Culture’’ or Locating a ‘Globally Structured Educational Agenda?’ Educational Theory,  
50 (4) pp. 427-448; M. Carnoy and D. Rhoten. (2002) What does globalisation mean for educational 
change: A comparative approach, Comparative Education Review, February. 
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to be a meaningful societal unit, but even Beck would not argue that society has ceased to 
exist, or that world society is irreducible.  
The harder question to answer is what is comparative analysis? It can be argued that all social 
science is essentially comparative. Durkheim famously wrote that ‘comparative sociology is 
not a particular branch of sociology, it is sociology itself, in so far as it ceases to be purely 
descriptive and aspires  to  account  for the facts’ (Smelser,  1976,  p.2).  But  for Durkheim 
accounting  for  the  facts  meant  understanding  the  pattern  of  relationships  between 
collectivities - or what he terms  ‘social facts’ - since this is what distinguishes sociology 
from other disciplines such as psychology. The study, statistical or otherwise, of variations in 
individual traits and behaviours is therefore, rightly in my view, not generally considered to 
be comparative study, although it  may share certain objectives with it,  as Smelser argues 
(1976). The difference, as Charles Ragin lucidly argues, is meta-theoretical: comparativists 
believe that societies are ‘real’ phenomena; methodological individualists  believe they are 
simply statistical abstractions (Ragin, 1981).
Collectivities,  or  societies,  are,  as  Durkheim conceded,  made  up of  individuals  and their 
actions; but they represent more than the sum of those. The patterns of variation between 
collective or societal properties and behaviours, and the determining relationships between 
them, cannot be explained by the mere aggregation of individual characteristics and actions. 
This requires analysis of the effects of structures and characteristics which are integral to the 
collectivity or  society itself,  and which  have  meaning only at  that  level.   Many societal 
characteristics cannot be considered, for instance, in individual level statistical analysis, either 
because they only show up as constants and cannot therefore be used to explain variation, or 
because they are meaningless at that level.  Distributional  properties,  for instance,  such as 
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income or skills spread - have no meaning at the level of the individual (Green, Preston and 
Sabates,  2003).  Comparative  research  is  thus  about  analysing  the  pattern  of  relationship 
between characteristics of societal or collective entities, whether they be at national or other 
levels. 
There are, of course, many ways of using comparative methods to understand relationships of 
cause  and  effect.  John  Stuart  Mill  famously wrote  about  the  Method  of  Agreement,  the 
Method of Difference, and the Indirect Method, which is a combination of the two (Mill, 
1970). All methods of comparison in social science, whether quantitative or qualitative, are, 
in  a  sense,  variations  on  this  theme,  although it  is  rarely possible  to  meet  Mill’s  ideal 
requirements that all possibly operative variables are considered, because we cannot know in 
advance  what  they all  are.  Comparison  works  by the  manipulation  of  variables,  holding 
certain variables constant, so as to test the independent effects of other observed variables on 
outcomes (Smelser, 1976). 
Quantitative  comparison  does  this  statistically,  establishing  probabilistic  relationships 
between  independent  and  dependent  variables,  and  has  the  advantage  that  it  can 
simultaneously test correlations amongst a large number of variables. However, quantitative 
analysis faces major limitations in cross-societal comparison. There are often insufficient data 
for many of the societal units that might be studied, thus reducing the number of possible 
cases in the sample to a point where there are more variables than there are cases. This makes 
statistical  analysis  unreliable.  Statisticians may respond by widening the sample to a very 
disparate  range of countries  or units,  to  achieve sufficient  cases,  but  this  introduces  new 
problems about comparing societies that are essentially incomparable except at meaningless 
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levels of abstraction. Statistical comparison across societal units can be very powerful when it 
pays respect to the complexity of societal phenomena, but it is not always possible. 
If comparative analysis is defined as comparing across societal entities, as argued here, then 
Charles Ragin is probably right to argue that the characteristic method is that of qualitative 
comparison, or what he calls the ‘comparative logical method’ (Ragin, 1981). This method 
does not work with samples or populations but with all relevant instances of the phenomenon 
in question, or with a set of these cases which the researcher decides are relevant, and which 
will set the limits of generalization for the explanation. Consequently, there is no temptation 
to compare large samples of dissimilar cases where the number of variables is so wide as to 
defy  analysis.  The  logical  method  has  a  number  of  other  advantages.  Firstly,  whereas 
statistical analyses finds it hard to deal with multiple causation, logical comparative analysis 
tends to work with configurations of conditions. The logical method requires explanation of 
all cases under consideration. A number of valid sets of preconditions for the outcome of 
interest can be identified,  whereas statistical analysis will only tend to bring out the most 
dominant  (Ragin,  1981).  Secondly,  whereas  statisticians  only  examine  the  relationship 
between specific variables, logical comparative analysis examines cases holistically and in 
their  ‘real’  context.   Qualitative  analysis  can  therefore  pay more  attention  to  the  actual 
mechanisms of causation, whereas statistical analysis alone cannot go beyond determining the 
probable strength and direction of causation. Logical comparative analysis cannot, of course, 
claim that its findings can be generalized beyond the cases under review, but in avoiding the 
universalizing tendencies of statistical approaches, it tends to respect the unities of time and 
place which are, arguably, essential to any credible historical or sociological analysis. 
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Logical  Comparative  analysis  can  be  conducted  in  a  number  of  different  ways  and  for 
different purposes. In their very illuminating article on comparative historical sociology, for 
instance, Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers distinguish between three primary types of 
comparative ‘logics-in-use’ (Skocpol and Somers, 1980). The first type, described as ‘parallel 
demonstration of theory’ and exemplified by Perry Anderson’s  Lineages of the Absolutist  
State  (1974), involves using comparison to illustrate the application of previously derived 
theories in different historical cases. The process of applying the theory to given cases may 
enrich and refine the theory, and may demonstrate the explanatory power of the theory, but 
comparison is not used here either to generate or validate the hypotheses. In the second type 
of ‘contrast-oriented’ comparison’, exemplified by Reinhard Bendix’s  Nation-Building and 
Citizenship (1977), what matters most is that the historical integrity of each case is respected. 
Comparison is used to demonstrate the variety and particularity of historical conditions, thus 
throwing into relief the essential characteristics of each unique case. Theorizing tends not to 
be as explicit as in the ‘parallel’ type, and comparison is not generally used to generate the 
explanations, which are usually derived at the level of each case, although within a common 
comparative frame of reference. 
The third type of comparison is described as ‘macro-causal analysis’ and it is here, and only 
here, where systematic  controlled comparison is used to generate and test hypotheses and 
explanations of cause and effects relationships. This, as Skocpol and Somers rightly argue, 
represents the most powerful form of comparative analysis and can involve works of huge 
complexity and power, such as Barrington Moore’s magisterial Social Origins of Democracy 
and Dictatorship (1966). The difficulty with such works lies in maintaining an analytically-
driven discourse, which moves constantly between positive and negative cases, whilst also 
maintaining sufficient narrative detail  about time and place so that the sense of historical 
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period is not lost.  Historians and historical sociologists will often disagree about the point at 
which such theorizing moves beyond the genuinely ‘historical’.
The methods of logical comparison which address cause and effect relationships are mostly 
variations  on the ‘indirect  method’ which Mill  thought  peculiarly suitable  for phenomena 
which have multiple  causation (Mill,  1970).  Basically,  the investigator examines multiple 
instances where a particular phenomenon occurs, noting whatever conditions they have in 
common,  and compares these with a range of instances  where the phenomenon does not 
occur. If certain condition(s) are common to the first set and are absent in the second set, and 
if the cases are otherwise similar, you can assume that these conditions represent causes of 
the phenomenon in question in these cases. The method is always liable to the accusation that 
there are ‘third causes’ which it has failed to observe, but this can be the case also, although 
it is less likely, in quantitative analysis, where a correlation may be due to an unobserved 
variable which affects both of the correlated variables simultaneously. Neither of the methods 
can determine for sure what is cause and what is effect, although quantitative methods have 
more chances of doing this where there is a longitudinal element and qualitative methods 
where  there  is  some  examination  of  the  causal  process.  Only  natural  experiments  and 
randomized controlled trials, with controlled samples and time frames, can escape these flaws 
but even there social scientists may fail to understand what attribute of the intervention is 
having a given effect. 
Macro-causal  comparative  analysis  is,  therefore,  one  –  uniquely  powerful  -  form  of 
comparative  analysis  amongst  several  others  valid  forms,  all  of  which  aspire  broadly to 
explanation. In relation, then, to comparative education we may broadly agree with Jurgen 
Schriewer’s contention that ‘as a social scientific method, comparison does not consist  in 
25
relating observable facts but in relating relationships or even patterns of relationship to each 
other’ (Schriewer and Holmes,  1988). In order to warrant claims to comparative method, 
comparative education must go beyond classification and parallel description of cases. This 
may optimally be done through macro analysis of causal relationships, but it may also involve 
‘contrastive’ and ‘parallel’ methods, where these are at least seeking to confront theoretical 
propositions with empirical observation. 
The problem with contemporary comparative education research is that much - or even most - 
of it is not actually comparative in any of the above senses. This is well illustrated by Angela 
Little’s  recent  survey of  articles  published in  Comparative Education between 1977 and 
1988 which shows that over 50 per cent have been single country studies. Some of these may 
be what Leach and Preston call  ‘comparisons in a single nation’ but Little concludes that 
‘only a  small  percentage  [of  articles]  have adopted  an explicitly comparative  approach’ 
(Little,  2000.  P.285).  Probably  the  vast  majority  of  published  studies  in  comparative 
education  generally  are  either  non-comparative  analyses  of  single  countries  or  parallel 
descriptions of education practises and policies across a group of countries (which would fall 
into  Hopkins’  and Wallerstein’s  category of  multi-national  studies:  1970). Whatever  the 
merits of these types of study, and they may be great, neither necessarily uses comparative 
methods  to  analyse  or  test  hypotheses  about  cause  and  effect  relationships,  or  even  to 
confront theory and evidence comparatively to produce what Weber called ‘understanding’. 
We may believe, as I do, that it is not helpful to police disciplinary frontiers or to draw sharp 
lines around field of study. But any field or discipline needs some core and distinguishing 
methodological  criteria.  In  comparative  education,  and  indeed  any field  of  comparative 
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research, these must include the use of comparison to further explanation or to test claims 
about cause and effect relationships.  In the absence of natural experiments in social science, 
the comparative method is the next best thing to scientific ‘proof’ and comparative education 
as a field would lose much credibility as a rigorous academic pursuit if it did not use this 
systematically.  
Comparative education needs to  compare,  and to  do this  systematically,  if  it  is  avoid the 
accusation that it too often degenerates into a catalogue of traveller’s tales, policy advocacy 
and opportunistic rationalizations of unscientific policy-borrowing. One way that it can do 
this is to draw more on the mainstream of comparative history and social science research for 
its concepts, methodology and evidence. But it is striking, when you revisit the central texts 
of  the comparative  education  canon,  how removed comparative  education  has  been from 
some  of  the  main  currents  in  comparative  history and social  science.  It  is  hard  not  too 
conclude that  comparative  education  has  been at  times  somewhat  insular;  sometimes  too 
preoccupied with self-referential internal debates, including those perennials about the limits 
of  policy  borrowing  and  the  boundaries  of  comparative  and  international  approaches. 
Comparativists would do well to take more account of relevant comparative work in cognate 
fields, as well as to remember the important work in comparative education carried out by 
‘unbaptised’ comparativists who do not go to comparative conferences and who do not see 
themselves  as  professional  comparative  educationalists  (Alexander,  2001).  Opening  up 
Comparative  Education  in  the  21st century  should  mean  embracing  all  those  who  use 
comparative methods and whose work can help in understanding educational problems.  
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Comparative  analysis  remains  the most  powerful  tool  for (causal)  explanation  of  societal 
aspects of the educational process. Globalisation does not reduce its usefulness, although in 
creating educational spaces which belong exclusively to neither nations nor systems, it makes 
us look to broadening our units  of analysis.  The major challenges posed for comparative 
education  today,  as  ever  before,  are  essentially  twofold.  Firstly,  it  is  to  make  the  field 
genuinely comparative.  Secondly, it  is to bring it  back from its  relative isolation into the 
mainstream of comparative social science/historical sociology where it rightly belongs. The 
enormous richness of the current social science debate around globalisation should at least 
help to make the second challenge attractive. 
Andy Green
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